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Thirty years ago, opportunities for U.S. banks to expand their geographic reach 
and product line were tightly constrained by charter limitations and by state and federal 
laws governing branch banking and holding-company affiliation.  The idea that, within a 
single generation, large U.S. banks could become nation-spanning, superpowered financial 
conglomerates seemed an academic pipe dream. 
In 1970, commercial banks could be distinguished from other kinds of financial 
institutions by two unique capacities: their right to offer demand deposits and their ability 
to make commercial loans.  Restrictions on thrift, securities, insurance, and sales-finance 
companies made it hard for these and other kinds of nonbank institutions to offer close 
substitutes for banking's signature products. 
This paper seeks to clarify how and why technological change undermined and 
finally demolished geographic and product-line constraints on U.S. financial institutions 
and to review event-study evidence about the intersectoral distribution of the benefits and 
costs of relaxing particular restrictions.  The evidence indicates that the demolition of 
these restraints intensifies public-policy concerns about the extent to which market power 
may be generated by large-bank mergers and safety-net subsidies that increase as an 
institution reaches megasize and megacomplexity. 
 
I. Financial-Institution Value Creation 
During the same 30-year interval, the conceptual foundations of financial 
intermediation theory similarly dissolved and reformed.  The longstanding premise that 
banks are profitable because society assigns them a series of "special" rights and duties  2
(cf. Tussing, 1967 and Corrigan, 1983) was displaced by the view that, even if it is not 
subsidized by special privileges, every financial institution can hope for special 
advantages from its access to scale
1, scope
2. and network economies (see Katz and 
Shapiro, 1994; Economides, 1993) and to private information about its customers 
(Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985).  This access generates implicit returns that competitive 
pressure allocates between each institution and its counterparties (Kane and Malkiel, 
1965).  The stronger the competition for clients, the larger is the proportion of the rents 
generated by informational and network advantages that an institution is likely to share 
with customers. 
Diamond (1984) explains how private information and monitoring costs influence 
a firm's choice between commercial loans and other public and private debt placements.  If 
the firm is new or potentially very risky, high monitoring and policing costs can render 
public debt infeasible.  Such firms can enhance their credit standing and transparency by 
submitting to monitoring and disclosure protocols devised by a high-quality bank.  Only 
when changes in its degree of riskiness may be readily discerned by outside investors, can 
a new or risky firm economically issue marketable debt. For borrowers whose affairs are 
vulnerable to financial distress, maintaining a relationship with a bank that has developed 
a respected loan-workout capacity may also generate low-cost options for renegotiating 
credit terms.  Evidence compiled by Chemmanur and Fulgheri (1994) supports this 
contention by indicating that firms that confront a high probability of financial distress are 
likely to choose bank credit over public debt. 
Stock price reactions provide evidence of the value of informational assets to 
banks and their borrowers.  James (1987) tests whether booking a bank loan conveys 
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favorable information to the marketplace.  He finds that borrower stock prices rise in 
response to the announcement of a bank loan agreement and fall in response to a private 
placement.  Preece and Mullineaux (1994) confirm that borrowing firms also experience 
positive event-window returns from successfully negotiating loan agreements with 
nonbanks.  Lummer and McConnell (1989) challenge the view that new loan agreements 
always convey benefits and establish that favorable revisions in an existing bank credit 
agreement definitely raise borrower stock prices.  Best and Zhang (1993) show that new 
loan announcements do convey positive information when extensive monitoring is 
entailed.   
Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) reinforce these findings about the value of 
private information by showing that small firms tend to benefit from maintaining a 
relationship with a bank.  Berger and Udell (1995) study the implicit and explicit prices 
small firms pay for bank lines of credit.  These authors find that borrowers with longer-
standing relationships receive lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral.  
When a bank refuses to pass on a fair share of a customer's informational rents, Houston 
and James (1996) confirm that switching to a new bank can allow a relationship customer 
to advantageously restructure its claim to informational rents. 
By offering pre-issue certification and post-issue monitoring services that alleviate 
informational gaps, banks (Slovin and Young, 1990) and investment bankers (Smith, 
1986; Booth and Smith, 1986; and Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992) smoothe a borrower's 
transition from private to public securities.  The quality of an investment bank's 
certification services is bonded both by its desire to protect the reputational capital it has 
accumulated and by the liability imposed on it by the Securities Act of 1933 for achieving 
a fair offering price (Beatty and Ritter, 1986).  Carter and Manaster (1990) and Johnson 
and Miller (1988) confirm the value of certification services by showing that an issuer 
receives a better price when its initial public offering (IPO) is managed by a prestigious 
investment bank. 
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Evidence of the value of postloan monitoring by investment banks is of two types.  
The first looks for proof of customer satisfaction.  Carter (1992) shows that firms whose 
IPO used a prestigious underwriter are less likely to employ a different underwriter when 
undertaking a secondary offering.  The second explores correlations between underwriter 
prestige and long-run returns realized by IPO investors.  Using investment-bank capital as 
a proxy for prestige, Michaly and Shaw (1994) find that IPOs managed by high-prestige 
investment bankers show less negative long-run returns than IPOs handled by other 
underwriters.  Using several alternative measures of prestige, Carter, Dark, and Singh 
(1998) and Jain and Kini (1999) confirm the robustness of this finding.  They show that 
the long-run performance of IPOs improves with the reputation of the underwriter.  
When they are binding, regulatory restrictions on an institution's product line and 
geographic span limit its ability to use its private information, contracting skills, and 
network economies efficiently.  For convenience, we term innovative expansions of an 
institution's product line as generating "cross-products."  To the extent that scope 
economies exist, an institution can leverage its privately held information to design, 
market, and price cross-products more economically than at least some monoline firms.  
Similarly, to the extent that scale economies exist, large institutions can advantageously 
absorb less-efficient small institutions. 
Even when they are successfully circumvented, restrictions on cross-product 
activity and interregional expansion generate circumvention costs that reduce the extent to 
which scope and scale economies can be realized.  To an individual institution, the direct 
value of relaxing these restraints is the sum of incremental profits and diversification 
benefits generated by new cross-product business and the value of resources released by 
no longer having to service pre-existing cross-product business in a circumventive 
manner.  If hit-and-run entry were possible, indirect effects would consist of reduced 
volume and margins for incumbent firms caused by the entry of cross-product suppliers.   
In financial institution regulation, stakeholders include: regulators, taxpayers, 
competitors, depositors, debtholders, stockholders, and consumer and corporate loan 
customers.  Different stakeholders are apt to be affected differently by the direct and  5
indirect effects of any changes in regulatory regime.  The difficulty of sorting out these 
stakes helps to explain why the political path to regulatory reform was a torturous one. 
In what follows, we draw on evidence assembled in the event-study literature to 
explore the extent to which freeing up financial conglomerates to expand in size and scope 
may have created, destroyed, or merely redistributed value from other stakeholders to 
managers and stockholders of affected financial institutions.   
 
II.  Evidence of Value Generated by Relaxing Geographic Constraints 
During the 19
th Century and most of the 20
th, federal and state restrictions on the 
location of branches and affiliates constrained the geographic span and corporate structure 
of U.S. banking organizations (see, e.g., Kane, 1996).  Prior to the last 30 years, whenever 
large banks opened loopholes in the fabric of interstate restriction, legislators usually 
worked to narrow them.  Congress' final important effort in this direction took place in 
1970 when it amended the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to restrict the affiliations 
and activities of nonbank subsidiaries of corporations owning a single bank.  The pre-
existing one-bank holding company (OBHC) loophole allowed OBHCs to own 
subsidiaries in any business they wished and to locate them anywhere.  Public-policy 
concern about this loophole came to the fore in July 1968, when Citigroup put itself into 
position to pass its operations through the loophole.   
Statistical evidence of the value of this and other loopholes in banking regulation 
comes principally from studying imputed stock-price reactions to important regulatory and 
legislative "events."  In an era when over 14,000 individual banks and many thousands of 
other depository institutions exist, these event studies inevitably focus on relatively small 
subsamples of banking and thrift companies whose stocks trade frequently.  Although 
most researchers make every effort to broaden the range of their samples, it is important to 
acknowledge that effects on small and medium-size depository institutions and bank 
holding companies (BHCs) are markedly undersampled.  We might also observe that the 
statistical significance of event returns is exaggerated somewhat by using confidence 
intervals rather than fiducial intervals.  6
Eisenbeis, Harris, and Lakonishok (EHL, 1984) provide the first econometric 
measures of the OBHC loophole's value to stockholders.  Comparing data for subsamples 
of 30 OBHCs, 35 multibank BHCs, and 13 autonomous banks, these authors document 
that the stock prices of Citicorp and its peer institutions experienced abnormal returns in 
the wake of Citi's announcing its OBHC strategy.  While EHL attribute some of the gains 
to activity diversification, they also show that OBHCs appeared to derive benefit from the 
greater ease with which they could circumvent state branching restrictions.  Institutions 
located in states that outlawed branch offices experienced higher returns than 
organizations residing in jurisdictions that authorized limited or statewide branching. 
EHL also demonstrate that forming an OBHC earned a significantly positive return 
before the 1970 Amendments, but not afterwards.  This tells us that the OBHC structure 
generated value as long as the loophole was open and reinforces the evidence that the 
1970 Amendments significantly reduced the value of establishing new OBHCs.  
Interestingly, for existing OBHCs, the give-and-take of the legislative process sustained 
much of their loophole value by grandfathering important OBHC privileges.  Event 
studies of the 1970 Amendments by Aharony and Swary (1981) and Martin and Keown 
(1981, 1987) establish that existing OBHCs did not experience a negative event return.   
After 1970, bank lobbyists chipped away steadily at state-level restrictions on 
intrastate and interstate expansion.  The impact of relaxing restrictions on out-of-state 
entry from a selection of designated or qualifying states has been studied extensively.  
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) show that operating costs and loan losses decrease in states 
that authorize statewide branching and interstate banking because better-run banks expand 
at the expense of less-efficient rivals.  Black, Fields, and Schweitzer (1990) show that 
authorizing out-of-state entry tends to benefit regional banks and to generate borderline-
significant negative event returns for giant money-center banks.  Looking at 35 state-level 
legislative events, Goldberg, Hanweck, and Sugrue (1992) find that the mean event return 
is insignificantly negative for in-state banks and significantly positive for non-money-
center out-of-state institutions.  Since potential target institutions figure to benefit from 
being exposed to an enriched set of acquirers, these results support the hypothesis that  7
state-level deregulation of entry frequently benefited potential out-of-state acquirers in 
designated multistate regions at the expense of in-state acquirers and money-center banks. 
To investigate this issue, Carow and Lee (1997) regress event returns on 
characteristics of individual banks and their home-state economic environments.  Using a 
sample of 271 banking organizations, these authors find that: 1) money-center banks tend 
not to benefit from reciprocal arrangements for freer entry (reflecting the frequent 
exclusion of their headquarters states from regional banking compacts); 2) banks whose 
small size and capital positions are characteristic of acquisition targets show higher returns 
than banks with the characteristics of acquirers; 3) banks in states whose economies show 
high growth rates and low banking concentration [conditions that favor acquisition or 
branching deregulation (see Kroszner and Strahan, 1999)] show higher returns; and 4) 
reciprocal agreements that defer the trigger date and authorize de novo entry reduce the 
relative bargaining power of in-state target banks. 
Carow and Heron (1998) and Brook, Hendershott, and Lee (1998) study abnormal 
returns generated by the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
(IBBEA).  Carow and Heron study the returns surrounding seven two-day event periods 
for a sample of 180 BHCs, half of which had already established interstate operations and 
half of which had not.  Brook et al. study a 61-day event period for a sample of 290 banks.  
Consistent with Carow and Lee, both studies find that IBBEA events generate a positive 
abnormal return for BHCs and that abnormal returns prove higher for BHCs with target-
like characteristics.  Carow and Heron also observe higher returns for banks headquartered 
in states that had previously refused to authorize interstate branching. 
These studies indicate that improving opportunities for geographic expansion 
benefited some types of financial institutions.   However, none of these studies determines 
how these putative benefits would be achieved.  Theory suggests that the benefits of 
geographic expansion could be realized relatively efficiently by transactions in the market 
for corporate control. 
 
III.  Sources of Gains to Acquirers and Targets in Combining Previously 
Autonomous Financial Services Firms  8
Table 1 lists eight possible motives for one bank to acquire another.  Economies of 
scale exist when the larger size of the post-acquisition enterprise permits it to garner more 
business or to produce services at a lower average cost than it could prior to the 
combination.  Economies of scope exist when the revenues or costs for one or more 
particular services are enhanced when they are produced jointly with one or more other 
services.  (Improved opportunities for diversification may be associated with expansions 
in either scope or scale).  X-inefficiency exists to the extent that managers of the target 
were not operating their firm in a fully value-maximizing way.  Market power is enhanced 
by any merger that improves the acquirer's ability to collect monopoly rents from the 
customer base. Managerial agency costs influence a deal whenever managers of the 
acquiring firm expect the acquisition to improve their personal welfare at the expense of 
shareholder interests.  Safety-net scale and scope economies exist when increased 
institution size promises to increase the benefits an acquirer can derive from market 
conjectures that the acquirer has grown too big and too complex for regulators to fail and 
unwind or even to discipline adequately (TBTFU or TBTDA).   
Event-study evidence on the value of removing state-imposed barriers to out-of-
state entry supports the hypothesis that removing geographic restrictions on bank 
expansion benefits potential acquirers by letting them assemble a customer base large 
enough to exhaust potential economies of scale and scope.  However, conventional studies 
of scale and scope economies in banking find that economies are exhausted at an asset size 
and product mix well inside the median size and diversity of most of the banks included in 
the event-study samples (Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993; Mitchell and Onvural, 1996).  
To reconcile these conflicting bodies of evidence, one must model the scale and scope 
economies generated by access to safety-net subsidies, as Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 
(2000) demonstrate.  
Making room for larger (and potentially more diverse) competitors implies that the 
transition to the post-deregulation equilibrium market structure would require the exit of 
many existing competitors.  With some firms facing elimination and others looking to 
grow and diversify, it is natural for stock markets to expect would-be survivors to explore 
opportunities to acquire the customer base of less-viable players.  In line with this  9
expectation, deregulation has been accompanied by a wave of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) in the financial industry.  According to the Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board, a G-10 study found that during the 1990s financial firms consummated roughly 
7,500 M&A transactions, over half of them in the U.S. (Ferguson, 2001). 
In nonfinancial combinations, event-study evidence indicates that abnormal returns 
generated by M&A announcements tend to average slightly negative for acquirers and 
markedly positive for target firms (e.g., Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1989).  Houston and 
Ryngaert (1994) and Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) report similar findings for the 
banking industry.  Although some authorities attribute weakness in acquirer returns to 
empire building by managers of acquiring firms (Roll, 1986; Gorton and Rosen, 1995), 
such a weakness is also consistent with a model in which targets generally occupy a better 
bargaining position than acquirers (cf. Schwert, 2000; Wulf, 2000).  Event-study evidence 
on reciprocal extensions of interstate entry supports the bargaining model, in that 
expanded opportunities for outside acquisition do not always benefit targets and often 
benefit potential out-of-state acquirers. 
The applicability of the bargaining model to banking derives additional support 
from the event-study evidence compiled by Carow and his coauthors.  These studies 
demonstrate that the division of abnormal returns between potential targets and acquirers 
in state-level events varies significantly with proxies for differences in bargaining power 
between different kinds of partners.   
Event Study Evidence on the Motives for Megabank Mergers: 
The patterns of target and acquirer returns observed are consistent with the 
hypothesis that M&A activity helps mega-institutions in the U.S. to achieve three kinds of 
interacting benefits: scale and scope economies; market power; and safety-net subsidies.  
We review six such studies here. 
Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) calculate event returns for targets of 302 banking 
mergers and acquisitions between 1978 and 1986, looking for evidence to discriminate 
between the hypothesis that the acquirer is motivated by TBTDA subsidies as against 
earnings diversification.  Although the authors hypothesize that their finding that a target's 
premium rises with its capital ratio favors the diversification motive over the risk-shifting  10
motive, bargaining theory undermines this conjecture.  Even if diversification benefits did 
not exist, a stronger capital position could be expected to increase a target's relative 
bargaining power and therefore its ability to force large acquirers to more fully shift 
TBTDA subsidies into the acquisition price. 
Virtually every M&A announcement includes management projections of the 
incremental profits the deal is expected to generate.  Padgett (1999) reports that, in the 
megadeals of recent years, realized operating-cost reductions have averaged much less 
than management projections.  Nevertheless, in a study of 41 large 1985-1996 banking 
combinations in which separate revenue and cost projections were disclosed, Houston, 
James and Ryngaert (2001) report that projected cost savings correlate significantly with 
consolidated acquirer and target stock returns, even though revenue projections do not.  
Houston et al. attribute the significant correlation to postmerger opportunities to cut 
operating costs and attribute the insignificance of revenue projections to management's 
failure to allow fully for deposit relationships lost in cost-saving branch closings.  
However, the post-combination cost savings these authors affirm need not be solely 
attributed to increased operating efficiency.  They could equally well be due to reductions 
in financing costs occasioned by increases in size-related safety-net subsidies. 
Kane (2000) argues that searches for TBTDA and market-power subsidies are apt 
to be contaminated by including deals in which the acquirer is not at least potentially a 
mega-institution.  Focusing on the 15 largest BHC acquisitions in each of the years 1991-
1998, he shows that stockholders of giant BHCs gain value from becoming more gigantic 
and gain even more value when the target is an in-state competitor.   
Evidence that announcement of M&A deals also significantly reduce risk-adjusted 
and maturity-adjusted yields on the uninsured debt of both acquirers and targets is 
compiled by Penas and Unal (2001).  Consistent with the hypothesis that TBTFU/TBTDA 
benefits help to motivate large-bank mergers, combinations of medium-size banks whose 
consolidation pushes combined bank assets beyond a $100 billion threshold produce 
particularly high announcement-month returns for their bondholders. 
Researchers have not yet studied effects of large-bank mergers on the stock prices 
of corporate customers.  However, banks that enhance their market power may be  11
expected to extract monopoly rents.  Compared to nonmerging banks, Prager and Hannan 
(1998) show that merging banks decrease retail deposit rates.  This is consistent with an 
expansion either in market power or in size-related safety-net subsidies.  Similar evidence 
emerges in the personal loan market.  Kahn, Pennacchi, and Sopranzetti (2000) document 
that personal loan rates are higher in more concentrated markets and that mergers between 
large banks result in higher personal loan rates.  In the highly contested market for 
automobile loans, however, mergers may increase efficiency.  For this loan category, the 
authors find that consequential mergers lower loan rates.  
 
IV.  Pre-GLBA Event-Study Evidence on the Value of Cross-Product Restrictions 
The previous section developed evidence that megabanks frequently benefit from 
increased size and geographic extension.  This section explores the extent to which 
expansion of product lines may unblock latent opportunities to build market power by 
intertwining large banks' information advantages and safety-net subsidies.  Because these 
opportunities are peculiar to large financial firms, their influence on relative bargaining 
power would not make itself felt in combinations of nonfinancial firms. 
Kwan and Laderman(1999) survey a large literature on the potential value to 
banking organizations of undertaking securities, insurance, and real-estate activities.  
Their findings are summarized in Table 2.  While the thrust of the evidence varies 
somewhat with the time periods studied and how individual researchers measure risk and 
return, Kwan and Laderman conclude that opportunities for BHCs to achieve profitable 
portfolio diversification are strong in securities and reasonably likely in insurance.  The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 finally opened these fields to BHCs and also 
opened banking to securities firms and insurance companies.  However, the road leading 
up to this legislation exhibits many curves and milestones.  Important entrance ramps had 
previously been opened de facto by regulatory arbitrage: i.e., from the dialectical 
interaction of bank efforts to circumvent Glass-Steagall and BHCA restrictions and 
regulatory competition for turf (see, e.g., Kane, 1984).  In this dialectical back and forth, 
regulatees innovatively adapted their product line and corporate structure to disable the  12
enforcement of statutory prohibitions and lobbied specialized regulators and 
Congressional committees to support or acquiesce in their circumventions.   
To illustrate the secular progression in the pressure this dialectic exerted on 
Congress, this section distinguishes and examines examples of two kinds of pre-GLBA 
milestone events: those initiated by bank efforts to innovate across pre-existing industry 
borders ("cross-industry acquisition events") and regulator-initiated efforts to redraw 
industry borders ("section 20 events"). 
Squeezing Securities Underwriting and Insurance Activity into Bank Product Lines 
1.  The BankAmerica-Schwab Event.  In November 1981, BankAmerica announced its 
intention to acquire Charles Schwab and Co.  This event promised to make BankAmerica 
the first commercial bank to offer securities brokerage.  Securities firms challenged this 
move by filing a protest with the Fed through their trade association, the Securities 
Industry Association.  Although the dispute was not settled until the Supreme Court 
upheld the permissibility of the deal in June 1984, the Fed approved the takeover in 
January 1983.  During the 14 months between the deal's announcement and Fed approval, 
600 banks either found a way to initiate brokerage services or at least stated their intention 
to do so.  National banks were assisted in their efforts by an OCC decision in August 1982 
to authorize national banks to offer discount brokerage outside the BHC structure through 
an operating subsidiary of the bank.   
Saunders and Smirlock (1987) analyze return and risk effects associated with the 
deal's announcement and subsequent Fed approval.  Although the event presaged new 
opportunities for BHCs to realize scope and scale economies, event returns for these 
authors' sample of BHCs proved insignificantly different from zero while stocks of 
securities firms showed a significant 2 percent decline.  Using the perspective supplied by 
Baumol's (1982) concept of contestable markets, we may infer that reducing barriers to 
BHC entry into brokerage services was seen as reducing the profit margins securities firms 
could enjoy without generating much in the way economic rents for BHC stockholders. 
2.  Section 20 Events.  Beginning in 1987, the Fed used its regulatory authority under the 
BHC Act to authorize BHC subsidiaries (known popularly as "Section 20 subs") to 
underwrite classes of securities that it had previously held to be "bank-ineligible" (BI).   13
The volume of BI business a Section 20 sub could book was limited by a strict cap on the 
percentage of the sub's gross revenue attributable to BI activity.  The Fed initially set the 
revenue cap at 5 percent.   
In April 1987, the Federal Reserve approved requests from Bankers Trust, 
Citicorp, and J.P. Morgan to underwrite four kinds of BI securities: commercial paper, 
asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, and municipal revenue bonds.  
During their first year of operation, these three firms' subs captured over 20 percent of the 
asset-backed securities market and approximately 2 percent of the mortgage-backed 
securities market.  In 1989, the Fed increased the revenue cap to 10% and added corporate 
bonds and equities underwriting to the list of now-permissible BI activities. 
Securities law prohibits the use of inside information for financial gain, while
banking regulators are specifically directed to identify and eliminate unsafe and unsound 
practices.  To insulate the bank and the safety net from risks taken in underwriting 
activities, the Fed initially placed stringent firewalls between the bank and its Section 20 
affiliate.  These barriers tightly restricted flows of information and resources between a 
bank and its underwriting arm.  However, in August 1996, the Fed proposed to dismantle 
some of the firewalls and proceeded subsequently to accomplish this in a gradual manner.  
In October, the Fed allowed employees to work simultaneously for the BHC parent and 
the brokerage subsidiary.  In December, the Fed increased the revenue limit from 10% to 
25%.  In January 1997, the Fed proposed further firewall reductions.  Finally, in August 
1997, the Fed adopted its August proposal.  Demolishing these firewalls shifted the burden 
of devising, monitoring, and enforcing substitute controls on managerial conflicts of 
interest from regulators to stockholders and customers. 
Several studies analyze the wealth and risk effects of Section 20 events.  Bhargava 
and Fraser (BF, 1998) analyze return and risk effects for banks and investment banks at 
four Section 20 event dates: (1) April 30, 1987, when the Fed authorized Bankers Trust, 
Citicorp, and Morgan to underwrite selected bank-ineligible securities; (2) January 18, 
1989, when the Fed added corporate debt and equity securities to its permissible list; (3) 
September 13, 1989 when the Federal Reserve raised the revenue cap to 10%; and (4) 
August 1, 1996, when the Fed proposed to raise the revenue cap again, this time to 25%.   14
Ely and Robinson (ER, 1998) look at event returns for the last event (which they date at a 
day earlier) and also for June 11 and December 20, 1996. On the June date, House 
Banking Committee Chairman James Leach urged the board to raise the revenue limit; on 
the December date, the Board announced its adoption of the 25% limit.   
ER and BF employ slightly different sampling frames.  BF sample the 50 largest 
publicly traded commercial-banking organizations and all publicly traded investment 
banks.  They subdivide their banking subsample into three classes: BHCs with prior 
underwriting approval, banks that had an application pending, and other large banking 
firms.  ER analyze a sample of 24 banking companies with Section 20 subs, 41 other 
banking organizations, and 20 investment banks. 
On the initial-authorization date of April 30, 1987, the three BHCs winning 
permission and the six BHCs that had already submitted applications showed significant 
event gains of 1.23 percent and 0.70 percent, respectively.  In contrast, portfolios 
constructed for investment banks and other large banking organizations show insignificant 
event returns.  On the risk dimension, BHCs with applications approved or pending 
recorded a statistically significant increase in exposure to undiversifiable risk.  Other 
commercial banks and investment banks showed no significant changes in risk.  
Apparently, the market expected that in pursuing the new opportunities a BHC would take 
on more diversifiable risk and benefit from doing so.  Looking at different subsamples of 
banks on this same event date, Appilado, Gallo, and Lockwood (1993) report that the 
population of money-center banks and a sample of regional banks experienced gains of 
1.60 percent and 1.46 percent, respectively. 
On the date when corporate debt and equity underwriting became permissible 
(January 18, 1989), BF find that organizations with prior approval showed a significantly 
negative return and increased total risk.  Other BHCs experienced significant gains, while 
investment-bank returns were not significantly affected.  Apparently, at a time when the 
federal safety net was being tested by efforts to resolve the S&L insurance mess, the 
power to underwrite corporate debt and equity was perceived as potentially poisonous 
fruit, apt to make the BHCs already engaged in cross-product underwriting riskier in ways 
that might not generate enough profit to support the increase.  15
BF report that raising the revenue cap to 10 percent in August 1989 also 
significantly reduced returns for approved BHCs and insignificantly reduced them for the 
other BHCs.  For their rougher partition, ER find no significant returns either on this date 
or on June 11.  However, the meaning of the August 1989 event is contaminated by the 
safety-net implications of the concurrent passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 
A related Section 20 event BF analyze is the Fed's August 1, 1996 proposal to raise 
the revenue cap to 25%.  This event is also contaminated, since the proposal coupled the 
cap increase with important firewall reductions.  BF report insignificantly negative event 
returns for all BHC subsamples and insignificantly positive returns for investment banks.  
However, significant evidence of decreased risk emerges as well.  Investment banks 
showed a decrease in total risk, while approved BHCs with Section 20 subs registered 
decreases in both total risk and in idiosyncratic risk. 
The final section 20 event occurred in December 1996 when the Fed announced its 
adoption of the 25% limit (rather than the lesser amounts some analysts had conjectured).  
ER find that section 20 BHCs experienced a significant event return of 1.25%, while 
securities firms and other banks showed an insignificant benefit of about 35 basis points.  
However, the signs test is significant, indicating that across individual firms in each 
subsample positive event returns predominated.  ER also use regression methods to show 
that investment-bank returns for this event are explained by size and profitability 
characteristics associated with being a takeover target. 
Cyree (2000) and Narayanan, Rangan, and Sundaram (NRS, this issue) cleverly 
neutralize the contaminating information in the Fed's August 1, 1996 proposal by adding 
an additional datapoint.  They treat the cap-increase proposal as having been put in play 
when the American Bankers Association (ABA) first recommended it to the Fed.  This 
assumption moves the revenue-cap proposal event forward --not to the Leach proposal 
date-- but to July 15, 1996.  Combining this proposal date with the adoption date for the 
cap adjustment generates a significantly positive compound-event return for BHC 
portfolios and allows them to interpret August 1, 1996 as predominantly a firewalls-
reduction proposal date.  Event returns on this date suggest that, whatever positive effect  16
was communicated by the Fed's endorsement of the ABA's proposal on August 1 was 
more than offset by the negative effect its firewalls-reduction proposal had on stockholder 
protections from managerial conflicts of interest. 
NRS are the first to investigate whether financial-institution customers as well as 
investment banks might have been hurt by securities-powers expansion.  NRS find that 
investment banks were sometimes harmed and sometimes helped by Section 20 events, 
but that the economic prospects of relationship customers at lead banks of sample BHCs 
were harmed in each event, usually significantly so. 
This raises the question of how much of the harm customer firms experience 
reflects a long-run reduction in their ability to negotiate prices for relationship services 
and how much reflects an increased exposure as taxpayers to costs of financing safety-net 
subsidies.  Monopoly power is an issue even though evidence assembled in Ang and 
Richardson (1994), Kroszner and Rajan (1997), and Puri (1994, 1996, 1999) indicate that 
in the short run bank entry made investment banking markets more competitive and 
improved spreads for customers.  The danger is that, unless the contestability of securities 
markets is preserved for future entrants by controlling the distribution of network-size 
benefits and safety-net subsidies to mega-institutions, short-run benefits could be reversed 
in the long run.  As Saunders (1999) notes, it may well be that "pro-competitive gains, 
resulting from Section 20 de novo entry into investment banking, will be rolled back" once 
the number of bank-unaffiliated investment bankers has shrunk substantially. 
Contestable-markets theory tells us that entry discipline will be curtailed if 
TBTDA safety-net subsidies make it unreasonable for would-be new entrants to expect to 
force the exit of economically inefficient affiliates of large banks.  This theory clarifies 
why and how TBTDA subsidies create market power.  By sustaining unprofitable 
affiliates, safety-net subsidies discourage new entry by preventing the prompt exit of 
incumbent bank-affiliated competitors from lines in which they are earning below-market 
risk-adjusted returns.  This marriage of market power and safety-net subsidies challenges 
authorities to respond promptly and conscientiously to evidence that large institutions 
benefit and customers might be harmed by cross-industry consolidation and particular 
changes in the regulatory regimes.   17
3.  OCC-Initiated Insurance Loopholes. Besides undermining the separation between 
banking and security activities, bank regulators authorized limited bank entry into 
insurance activities.  Using its authority under the incidental-powers clause of the National 
Banking Act, the OCC authorized national banks to sell variable annuities and fixed-rate 
annuities in 1985 and 1990, respectively.  The essence of these rulings was the opinion 
that annuity contracts are not insurance.  In 1995, The Supreme Court upheld the OCC 
interpretation.   
Carow (2001b) studies event returns on these three event dates.  A related paper by 
Cowan, Howell, and Power (CHP, this issue) looks at event returns for the Supreme Court 
ruling and three other dates at which OCC loophole powers were tested or asserted: two 
appeals-court decisions preceding the Supreme Court decision and a 1994 OCC ruling that 
a national bank could structure an annuity as an insured deposit.   
Carow samples life insurance companies, property/casualty companies, and banks.  
CHP sample life insurance companies and banks.  Both papers observe negative event 
returns for insurance companies, but find different results for banks.  In Carow's event 
window, banks fail to show an event return.  In the events and sample of banks examined 
by CHP, returns for banks are significantly positive.  Carow shows that only insurance 
companies that use an agency sales system were affected significantly; presumably the 
market thought brokerage companies could benefit from distributing bank-underwritten 
annuities.  CHP find that over their event windows large life insurance companies with 
less capital recorded higher returns than other life companies.   
One of the events CHP analyze is the OCC's approval of a so-called "retirement 
CD" designed by Blackfeet National Bank.  The retirement CD sought explicitly to extend 
the deposit insurance safety net under an annuity product, potentially transfering wealth 
from taxpayers and insurance companies to banks.  Lacking parallel guarantees, insurance 
companies would be hurt because they could not expect to price competitively an annuity 
product offering a comparable level of risk.  Consistent with expanding safety-net 
guarantees, CHP find event returns highest for large banks with greater risk and event 
returns to be lowest for low-rated insurers with large annuity reserves.    18
The OCC not only expanded bank annuity rights, but also a bank's right to sell a 
broad range of other insurance products.  In 1986, the OCC expanded a longstanding 
small-town exception contained in the National Banking Act to permit any national bank 
or branch office located in a town whose population was 5,000 or less to sell insurance to 
customers located anywhere.  In two separate rulings, the Supreme Court upheld the 
OCC's interpretation.  Although the banks sampled showed no significant event returns, 
across these three dates, Carow (2001b) finds that life insurers and smaller insurance 
companies suffered substantial losses. 
4.  State-Level Extensions of Insurance Powers.  State-chartered banks looked to state 
legislatures to keep national banks from eroding their franchise.  By 1999, 15 states 
allowed banks to act as insurance brokers/agents and 5 states authorized underwriting 
activity.  We found studies of only one state-level event of this type: a proposition ("Prop 
103") approved by California voters on November 8, 1988.  The proposition, which dealt 
principally with insurance pricing, included permission for state-chartered banks to 
become vendors of life, health, and property/liability insurance products.  Shelor and 
Cross (1994) show that state-chartered banks benefited from the passage of Proposition 
103, while federally chartered depository institutions showed no significant reaction.  
Although many authors find negative event returns from this event for insurance 
companies, this development cannot fairly be attributed to potential bank entry due to the 
contaminating effects of the pricing restrictions. 
5.  Other Cross-Industry Acquisition Announcements.  Event study evidence on the effect 
of bank expansion into securities and insurance activities supports the twin possibilities of 
safety-net subsidies and increased market power.  Expanding the safety net intensifies the 
potential for large institutions to use their increased market power to transfer wealth from 
taxpayers, competitors, and customers.  Exploring this perspective, this section reviews 
event returns generated from cross-industry acquisitions. 
In intensifying pressure to pass the GLBA, the single most important event was the 
Citicorp-Travelers combination.  Johnston and Madura (2000) and Carow (2001a) 
examine announcement returns generated by this deal.    19
Johnston and Madura (2000) divide their sample into three subsamples: large 
brokerage firms, large banks, and medium-sized banks.  All subsamples show 
significantly positive event returns.  Large banks and brokerage firms show the largest 
returns.  We interpret these results as predicting two things: a near-certain end for Glass-
Steagall and BHCA restrictions on the insurance and securities activity of banking 
organizations and that larger institutions would be in a better position to benefit from this 
deregulation. 
Carow (2001a) examines a different sample, one that excludes brokerage firms and 
focuses on size effects at banks and insurance companies.  Although no statistically 
significant event return emerges for the average sample bank, a positive size effect is 
observed.  In particular, event returns for banking institutions with assets greater than $10 
billion significantly exceed returns at smaller banks.  Here, as elsewhere, the public-policy 
issue is the extent to which the apparent benefits trace to efficiency gains, increased 
market power, or safety-net expansion. 
Prior to the Citicorp-Travelers event, BHCA restrictions on the ownership of U.S. 
banks by nonbank companies meant that most cross-industry acquisitions were initiated by 
BHCs as ways to enter the product markets of nonbank financial companies.  BHC entry 
into nonbank markets tends to squeeze the margin of incumbent nonbank competitors.  
The standard pattern of event response was for competing nonbank companies to lose 
value and for the value of bank stocks either to be unaffected or to increase slightly. 
Event returns generated by BHC acquisitions of securities firms have been studied 
most extensively.  Davidson, Hatfield, and Glascock (1994) analyze acquisitions of 
brokerage houses, comparing event returns across three classes of acquirer: other 
brokerage houses, BHCs, and nonfinancial firms.  Positive event returns emerge only for 
acquirers that are already in the brokerage business.  BHC and nonfinancial acquirers fail 
to show significant returns. 
Mergers and acquisitions of European financial firms are studied by Cybo-Ottone 
and Murgia (2000).  Sampling 1988-1997 deals announced between large European 
financial institutions, these authors find the combined event return of acquirers and targets 
to be significant.  However, when they partition results by country and industry,  20
significant gains emerge only for bank-on-bank combinations within a given country and 
for deals that enable a bank to enter insurance.  In contrast, unions of European banks with 
securities firms or foreign institutions fail to produce significant returns. 
Kryzanowski and Ursel (1993) examine event returns in Canada, looking at the 
1986-87 unfolding of provincial and federal permission for banks to become 100% owners 
of securities firms ("permission events") and at 1987-89 announcements of bank takeovers 
of investment dealers ("takeover announcements").  Across the sample of dealers studied, 
only one permission event generates a significantly positive return; no permission event 
significantly affects any sample bank.  Most bank acquisitions of investment dealers show 
insignificant negative returns for the acquiring bank and insignificant positive returns for 
the target.  However, when cumulated across events, target and acquirer returns become 
significant.   
V.  Effects of Enacting GLBA 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 endorses cross-sector mergers 
within the United States financial industry.  Henceforth, financial conglomerates can 
compete in a regulatory environment that does not require circuitous methods to bypass 
government restrictions on product-line extension.  Of course, banks still operate under 
important constraints.   The GLBA continues the tradition established by the BHCA of 
1956 and the 1970 Amendments of restricting acquisitions of a bank or bank holding 
company by a commercial firm.  The GLBA even extends the reach of this tradition for 
the first time to unitary thrift holding companies.  Previously, this organizational form 
allowed any commercial firm to own a single thrift institution.  While no study directly 
tests the value of the unitary-thrift loophole, Carow and Heron (this issue) infer that its 
demise contributed to the reduction in stock value that thrifts experience from GLBA 
events.  Whether this decline traces to reduced opportunities to privately diversify 
financial-services risk or reduced opportunities to benefit from safety-net subsidies is once 
more an open question. 
 While the GLBA closed the unitary-thrift loophole, it allows registered financial 
holding companies "to engage in commercial activities that the Federal Reserve 
determines to be complementary" to financial operations or to encompass the scope of  21
activities necessary to provide merchant banking.  Today, banks and bank holding 
companies are allowed to hold up to 4.9 percent of the voting shares in any commercial 
firm without regulatory approval.   
Carow and Heron  show that stockholders of large financial institutions gained 
substantially more from the passage of the GLBA than smaller institutions did.  In Table 
3, we use Narayanan, Rangan, and Sundaram's methods and their list of important 1997 
borrowers to conduct a preliminary investigation of how the GLBA may have affected 
financial-institution customers
3. 
Our investigation focuses on two pivotal events in the GLBA's road to passage: the 
October 22, 1999 announcement of the Conference Committee agreement and the 
Travelers-Citicorp announcement of April 1998.  In each case, we employ a three-day 
event window consisting of the event day and the trading days immediately before and 
after the event. 
In each window, we edit the NRS sample by deleting individual firms whose 
inclusion might obscure the impact of the changing probability of final Congressional 
action.  We decided that six conditions justified deletion.  The deletion conditions we 
impose and the concerns they address are as follows: 
1.  returns missing during the 200 trading days preceding the event window (to 
more sharply benchmark the normal return); 
2.  stock failed to trade during at least 50 percent of the benchmarking period (to 
minimize the influences of nonsynchronous trades); 
3.  stock value of firm fell below one dollar during the benchmarking period (to 
eliminate firms in danger of being delisted); 
4.  absence of asset, debt, or earnings information on Compustat (relevant only in 
secondary tests); 
5.  news about the firms was reported during the three-day event window on either 
the Dow Jones News Retrieval Wireservice, PR Newswire, Business 
                                                 
3 Readers should recognize the selection and survival bias this entails.  Given the significance of our 
preliminary findings, we intend to update and extend the list of customers in future research.  22
Newswire, or M2 Presswire (to minimize contamination by firm-specific 
events); 
6.  daily returns during any event window surpassed 15 percent in absolute value 
(on the grounds that such a strong move might well reflect unreported firm-
specific news). 
We calculate event returns as deviations from a single-index market model, using 
ordinary least squares
4 and the CRSP value-weighted index to proxy returns on the market 
portfolio.  To measure event returns, we employ Brown and Warner's (1980, 1985) 
standardized cumulative average event return.  We also employ a z-statistic that offers a 
binomial test of the predominance of negatively or positively signed event returns and a 
test of the difference between two sample proportions (see Mason, Lind, and Marchal 
(1999, p. 326-330).   
Table 3 investigates event returns for the GLBA event; Table 4 studies event 
returns for the Citicorp-Travelers event.  Each table has five sections.  Section A compares 
results for relationship customers with a control sample of other nonfinancial firms; 
Section B partitions the sample according to whether or not a firm is a customer of a 
Section 20 banking affiliate; Section C partitions the sample into two groups according to 
the size of its market capitalization; and Sections D and E seek to compare results for 
firms that might have more and less bargaining power in negotiating a bank loan. 
Customer Response to the GLBA Event.  Table 3 investigates event returns for the 
passage of GLBA.  Section A compares the mean event return for the nonfinancial-
customer sample identified by NRS with the mean return for all nonfinancial firms posting 
return data on CRSP.  The customer sample shows a significant mean loss of 1.47 percent 
from the GLBA event and individual event returns are predominantly negative.  These 
losses support the hypothesis of GLBA wealth redistribution.  Expanding bank powers 
apparently harmed the prospects of BHC relationship customers more than other firms, 
inasmuch as bank customers show a significantly lower mean event return than the control 
                                                 
4 Karafiath (1994) investigates effects of "event-clustering" by Monte Carlo procedures. He finds that OLS 
is well-specified in finite samples that include several industries and that, for sufficiently large cross-
sections, there is no advantage to using several other more complex estimators such as the Multivariate 
Regression Model.  23
sample.  The 4,487-firm control sample recorded an insignificant event return of -0.68 
percent and was more evenly divided between positive and negative responses than the 
customer sample.
5 These findings reinforce the evidence of customer damage that NRS 
found for Section 20 events. 
Following the lead of NRS, we also separate the sample by whether or not a firm is 
a customer of a Section 20 BHC.  We find that non-Section 20 customers have lower 
returns (-2.05 percent) than Section 20 customers (-1.27 percent), but the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
The market power that can be exerted on a relationship customer varies inversely 
with the negotiating power of the borrower.  To proxy the ability of a firm to negotiate 
favorable prices and services, we look first at customer size.  We arbitrarily define "large-
cap firms" as those whose outstanding stock exceeds $100 million in market value.  
Consistent with the hypothesis that smaller firms have less negotiating power, small-cap 
firms show a mean event return of -1.71 percent compared to -1.17 percent for large-cap 
firms.  However, these returns differ insignificantly from each other.   
Conventional wisdom holds that credit-constrained firms would be most likely to 
be harmed by reduced competition.  Sections D and E use Compustat data to identify 
subsamples of customer firms that might feel credit-constrained. We proxy credit 
constraint in two ways: by debt ratings (where these exist) and by debt-to-asset ratio.  The 
hypothesis being tested is that the formation of financial conglomerates may reduce 
competition between public and private debt markets and between large and small 
institutions, allowing banks to adjust services or prices at customer expense.  
Section D proxies credit constraint by credit rating.  Because debt-rating data are 
spotty, incorporating them severely limits the size of the usable sample.  Although the 
small sample sizes rob the result of significance, mean returns are almost two percentage 
points lower for low-rated firms.  This suggests that the GLBA might have particularly 
harmed credit-constrained firms. 
                                                 
5 The significance of the difference is not critical, since any firm is potentially a customer of a megabank.  
Also, although the market index averages returns on financial and nonfinancial firms, abnormal returns need 
not average zero across the market on an event day.  Even when financial firms have positive abnormal 
returns, the average abnormal return of nonfinancial firms can be positive, too.  24
Section E classifies firms by degree of debt usage.  Measures of debt usage are 
frequent enough on Compustat that we lose only 11 members of the section A sample
6.  
Firms whose debt-to-asset ratio exceeds the arbitrary limit of 10 percent show lower 
returns than firms with a smaller ratio, -1.74 percent as against -1.00 percent.  Again, the 
difference is not significant. 
These findings reaffirm the evidence of customer damage that NRS found for 
Section 20 events.  In all but one of the cells examined, relationship customers are affected 
adversely.  Most importantly, the mean adverse effect of each event is significant for the 
full sample.  Despite smaller sample sizes, cumulative event returns are significant for 
several subsample cells and the signs test proves significant in the majority of cases.  Only 
33.87 percent of customer firms showed positive event returns during the GLBA passage 
event and only 37.34 percent showed positive returns during the Citicorp-Travelers event 
window. 
Customer Response to the Citicorp-Travelers Event.  Using the same sample partitions as 
Table 3, Table 4 looks at the event returns generated by the Citicorp-Travelers 
announcement.  Because the sample screens delete fewer cases, sample sizes are slightly 
larger than in the previous table. 
In this event firms that were not classified as "relationship customers" fare 
marginally worse than relationship customers do.  Among relationship customers, those 
with large caps, high debt usage, and a section 20 BHC relationship suffer significant 
losses. 
Tables 3 and 4 analyze value-weighted returns.  For the GLBA Passage Event, the 
same magnitude and pattern of significant results emerge whether we look at equal-
weighted or value-weighted returns.  However, in the Citicorp-Travelers event, equal-
weighted event returns are generally smaller in magnitude and never statistically 
significant.  Achieving greater importance in the value-weighted metric is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the Citi-Travelers combination threatened large customers more than 
small ones.  Giant financial institutions would be able to expand their political clout, build 
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market share, and price their services less favorably for any corporation too large to expect 
smaller financial institutions to handle their needs. 
Summary.  Carow (2001) and Carow and Heron (2001) show that both events generated 
larger positive event returns for very large financial institutions than for smaller ones.  
This GLBA event-study evidence suggests: (1) that GLBA events increased the bargaining 
power in M&A negotiations that very large bank acquirers enjoy relative to targets and (2) 
that financial conglomeration threatens to adversely affect nonfinancial customers.  Our 
tests cannot distinguish how much nonfinancial corporations were harmed as 
counterparties to future bank transactions from how much they were harmed as taxpayers 
that might be asked to finance safety-net subsidies.  Simply put, results are consistent with 
the twin hypothesis that relaxing product-line restraints decreased customer bargaining 
power and increased the economic and political clout of giant U.S. institutions.  
Megainstitutions' increased clout comes from opportunities to become even larger and 
more complex than ever before.  Managements may use their clout economically to 
discourage new entrants and politically to weaken regulatory discipline and expand their 
access to safety-net subsidies.  
 
VI.  Summary and Implications 
Hypothesis testing is an endless learning process.  Evidence produced by studies of 
how bank stock returns respond to regulatory, legislative, and M&A events is suggestive 
and provisional rather than decisive.  Still, most public-policy economists would sleep 
better if the value bank stockholders have gained from new regulatory freedoms could be 
traced with great likelihood to opportunities for financial firms to jettison redundant staff 
and facilities.  Unfortunately, the preponderance of the evidence reviewed here favors the 
alternative working hypothesis that extending the geographic reach and product lines of 
large U.S. banking organizations has at least temporarily diluted the combined impact of 
regulatory, creditor, and competitive discipline that mega-institutions confront. 
Event-study evidence shows that, except where new problems of corporate 
governance have been created, stockholders of large U.S. banks have usually gained when 
restrictions on geographic and product expansion have been relaxed.  Relaxing a binding  26
constraint is bound to increase welfare in a partial-equilibrium model. However, in a 
general-equilibrium context, the benefits bank stockholders gain from restraint relaxation 
may come entirely at the expense of competitors, customers, and the general taxpayer. 
Event studies of rulings that authorized large banks to enter securities and 
insurance markets typically show that stockholders of incumbent competitors in these 
markets lost value.  This could be because bank entry was expected to improve product 
prices, which would generate value for customers.  However, although effects on 
customers have been examined for only a few events, results so far are disturbing.  
Narayanan, Nanda, and Sundaram (this issue) show that relationship customers at banks 
lost value as BHC securities powers expanded.  Tables 3&4 of our paper show that 
GLBA-passage and Citicorp-Travelers announcement events hurt corporate customer 
stocks as well.  Finally, Prager and Hannan (1998) and Kahn, Pennacchi, and Sopranzetti 
(2000) offer evidence that consequential bank mergers harm consumers by decreasing 
deposit rates and increasing personal loan rates. 
If operating-cost reductions were the predominant source of event gains from 
removing regulatory restraints and effecting megabank mergers, one would expect 
relationship customers to benefit along with bank stockholders.  However, researchers 
have found that customers lost value in the few instances in which the customers' stake in 
deregulation events has been examined.  Future research should investigate how 
consistently this result carries over to other deregulation events. 
The theory of contestable markets indicates that the entry barriers that TBTDA 
safety-net subsidies create for other entrants generate monopoly power for megabanks in 
every market in which they participate.  The TBTDA hypothesis also predicts that events 
that presage or announce increases (decreases) in FDIC deposit-insurance premiums 
would lower (raise) returns on the stock of large and more-leveraged institutions more 
than it would affect the stock of other banking firms.  Across ten 1990-1991 premium-
increase events and five 1993-1995 premium-decrease events, this is the pattern that 
Biswas, Fraser, and Hebb (2000) observe. 
Of course, Fed officials repeatedly deny that any institution is too big to fail.  But 
what else could they say?  If they were to confirm the existence of a universe of TBTFU  27
banks, creditors and depositors would have little reason to monitor and police the risk 
exposures of the institutions so designated.  By denying the obvious fact that some banks 
are too large, too complex, and too well-connected to discipline adequately, officials at 
least manage to maintain constructive ambiguity about where individual banks and BHCs 
stand along the TBTFU/TBTDA continuum.  That the limits of safety-net support are 
ambiguous by no means contradicts the hypothesis that TBTDA benefits exist for most 
major institutions and that these benefits intensify sharply whenever a mega-institution 
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Cost-Based Economies of Scale 
Brand-Based Economies of Scale 
Revenue-Based Economies of Scale 
Safety-Net-Based Economies of Scale 
Revenue-Based Economies of Scope 
X-Efficiency 
Market Power 
Managerial Agency Costs 
•  Pursuit of size to strengthen managerial entrenchment 
•  Pursuit of size-based increased in executive salaries 
 
 
Source:  Kane (2000), as adapted from Dermine (1999). 
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TABLE 2: RISK AND RETURN CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED 
NONBANK ACTIVITIES 
  Relative to Banking  Potential Effect on BHC 
Risk of Engaging 
Activity Profitability
2 Risk
3  in Nonbank Activity
1 
Securities
4      
  Overall  Higher  Higher  Varies
5 
     Primary Dealers  Lower  Higher  Decrease 
     Non-primary dealers  Same  Higher  Decrease 
  Underwriting
6 Varies
7 Higher  Decrease 
     Primary Dealers  Same  Higher  Decrease 
     Non-primary dealers  Lower  Higher  Decrease 
Trading Higher  Higher  Varies
7 
     Primary Dealers  Higher  Higher  Decrease 
     Non-primary dealers  Higher  Higher  Increase 
Bank-eligible Securities  Higher  Higher  Decrease 
      
Insurance      
  Agency  Higher  Varies
5 Varies
8 
  Underwriting       
     Property & Casualty  Higher  Varies
8 Varies
8 




      
Real Estate      
  Agency  Higher  Higher  N.A. 
  Development  Varies
9 Varies
8 Increase 
  Direct Equity Investment  Varies
10 Higher  Varies
10 
  Title Abstract  Higher  Varies
8 N.A. 
  Operators  Varies
5 Varies
11 N.A. 
  Condominium  
      Management and Co-op 
Lower Higher  N.A. 
Source: Kwan and Laderman (1999) 
1The effect on banking-organization risk of engaging in the nonbank activity.  "Decrease" indicates that there exists a nonzero weight on nonbank 
assets such that an organization with bank and nonbank assets has lower risk than an organization with only bank assets.  However, there may not 
be a decrease in risk for all nonbank weights, and the maximum nonbank weight that permits a decrease in risk may be quite small.  "Increase" 
indicates that all nonzero weights on the nonbank activity would increase banking organization risk. 
2Some studies use accounting return on equity ROE and some use accounting return on assets ROA to measure profitability. 
3Variance of ROE or ROA, coefficient of variation (standard deviation of returns divided by mean of returns) of ROE or ROA, or probability of 
bankruptcy. 
4Except in the last item, securities activities involve bank-eligible and bank-ineligible securities. 
5Depends on profitability or risk measure and, depending on the risk measure, may also depend on methodology of particular study. 
6Underwriting, dealing, and brokerage.  May also include provision of investment advice. 
7Depends on whether data cover primary dealers or non-primary dealers. 
8Depends on profitability or risk measure used. 
9Depends on profitability measure and time period. 
10Depends on whether REIT data or thrift service corporation data are used, and may also depend on time period and/or methodology. 
11Depends on time period.  39
TABLE 3: EVENT RETURNS FOR THE GLBA PASSAGE EVENT 
(OCTOBER 21, 22 AND 25, 1999) 
(Value-Weighted Returns) 














4487 -0.68%  *** -5.58  43.70% -8.43  *** 
Difference in Means    -0.79% *  1.83  -9.83%  2.65 *** 
Section B 
Customers of 
Section 20 banks 
 
137 -1.27%  **  -2.21  33.58% -3.85  *** 
Customers of Non-
Section 20 banks 
 
49  -2.05% **  -2.16  34.69%  -2.14 ** 
Difference in Means    0.78%  0.72  -1.11%  0.14 
Section C 
Small cap 
ψ$100 mil equity 
 
106 -1.71%  *** -2.72  33.96% -3.30  *** 
Large cap 
>$100 mil equity 
 
80 -1.17%  -1.45 33.75%  2.91  *** 
Difference in Means    -0.54%  0.69  -0.21  0.03 
Section D 
Non-Investment 
Grade Bond Rating 
 




11 0.30%  0.15 54.55% 0.30 




113 -1.74%  **  -2.33  34.51% -3.29  *** 
Debt/Assets<10% 
 
62  -1.00% *  -1.87  32.26%  -2.79 *** 
Difference in Means    -0.74%  0.11  2.25%  0.30 
 
*** Significantly different from zero at 1 percent 
** Significantly different from zero at 5 percent 
* Significantly different from zero at 10 percent  40
TABLE 4: EVENT RETURNS FOR CITICORP-TRAVELERS ANNOUNCEMENT 
(APRIL 3, 6, AND 7, 1998) – (Value Weighted Returns) 














4966 -1.29%  ***   -16.91  35.38%  -20.60 *** 
Difference in Means    0.29%  1.41  1.96%  0.61 
Section B 
Customers of 
Section 20 banks 
 
176 -1.17%  **  -2.31  37.50% -3.32  ***  
Customers of Non-
Section 20 banks 
 
57 -0.45%  -0.43 36.84%  -1.98  ** 
Difference in Means    -0.72  0.77  0.66%  0.09 
Section C 
Small cap 
ψ$100 mil equity 
 
118  -0.67% -0.75 43.22% -1.47 
Large cap 
>$100 mil equity 
 
115 -1.33%  **  -2.40  31.30% -4.01  *** 
Difference in Means    0.66%  1.18  11.92%  1.88 * 
Section D 
Non-Investment 
Grade Bond Rating 
 




9 -1.63% -1.60 33.33% -1.00 




134 -1.08%  *  -1.71  38.06% -2.76  *** 
Debt/Assets<10% 
 
86 -0.88%  1.46  34.88%  -2.80  *** 
Difference  in  Means   -0.20% 0.08 -3.18% 0.48 
 
*** Significantly different from zero at 1 percent 
** Significantly different from zero at 5 percent 
* Significantly different from zero at 10 percent 
 